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NO. 21 APRIL 2019 Introduction 
Stuck in the Twilight Zone? 
March 2019 Municipal Elections in Turkey 
T. Deniz Erkmen 
After 16 years of Tayyip Erdoğan in power and with almost total control of the bu-
reaucracy and the mainstream media, it has become hard to imagine a Turkey in 
which he and his party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), would not win an 
election. Yet, after a long nail-biter of an election night, Turkey woke up on April 1 
to results indicating a major shift: Defying expectations, Turkish voters had delivered 
a challenge to the dominance of the governing coalition. While this came as a sur-
prise to some, it points to growing discontent among voters that was able to find 
expression through institutional means. This was made possible by various parts of 
the opposition that ran effective alliance strategies and campaigns as well as the elec-
tion-night process. This accomplishment of the opposition, however, does not neces-
sarily mean an easy shift to a democratic path in Turkey. Much depends on how 
various actors in the governing coalition respond to this new picture. 
 
On March 31, Turkish citizens voted in mu-
nicipal elections for city mayors, district 
mayors, district councils, and neighborhood 
heads. The elections carried symbolic sig-
nificance even though they were municipal 
elections: They came after the constitutional 
referendum of 2017 and the presidential 
election of 2018, which transformed Tur-
key’s political system from a parliamentary 
into an executive presidential system and 
put Erdoğan at the head of the newly de-
signed state with enormous de jure powers. 
Following those political events, the mu-
nicipal elections were supposed to be a clos-
ing act, granting Erdoğan and his AKP – 
together with their coalition partner, the 
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) – total 
control over the country for the next four 
years until the scheduled elections in 2023. 
Yet, how the results would turn out re-
mained an enigma. Happening amidst the 
worst economic crisis that the country has 
experienced since 2001, with the inflation 
rate hitting 20 percent and unemployment 
12.6 percent, it was obvious that the elec-
tions constituted a test for the governing 
coalition. Turkish voters have a history 
of responding to the economy with their 
votes. However, as the mainstream media 
as well as state resources are fully con-
trolled by the government, the ability of the 
government to shape the public discourse 
and affect voter perception to its advantage 
was massive, whereas the opposition’s 
ability to campaign was severely limited. As 
such, it was not at all clear how voters – 
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fatigued from political instability and insti-
tutional reshuffling that dominated the 
country after the failed coup of 2016 as well 
as from seven elections in five years – were 
going to respond. 
Rival Campaigning Strategies 
During the campaign period, the governing 
coalition followed the strategy that it had 
used extensively before. Rather than focus-
ing on immediate local concerns – as would 
be common in municipal elections – the 
coalition presented the elections as a refer-
endum on the party and Erdoğan, equating 
their control of the state with the survival, 
or beka, of it. As expected, Erdoğan took on 
a very polarizing tone, accusing all parts of 
the opposition (and not just his usual sus-
pects, Kurdish politicians) as being related 
to terrorism. The campaign period was 
defined by verbal attacks, slander, and 
threats to opposition politicians on an un-
precedented level. Not only was an official 
investigation started against Mansur Yavaş 
– the main opposition party candidate 
of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in 
Ankara – Erdoğan openly threatened to 
replace elected mayors again if they were 
“related to terrorists.” This was a direct 
threat to Kurdish cities that saw elected 
mayors from the Kurdish Democratic Re-
gions Party (DBP) replaced with trustees in 
2016. Various polls, however, showed that 
– unlike in 2015, when the country was 
shaken by multiple bombings – these tac-
tics fell on deaf ears as voters continued to 
consider the economy and not security, or 
beka, as the main issue affecting their lives. 
In the face of this slander, all parts of the 
opposition were successful in keeping an 
even, non-polarizing tone and running 
campaigns that did not react to Erdoğan. 
Ekrem İmamoğlu – the CHP candidate for 
Istanbul who was the mayor of a middle-
class district in Istanbul before, but was not 
a nationally known figure at the start of the 
campaign – shone through with his non-
ideological, non-polarizing style, and active, 
hands-on campaigning. The CHP established 
a formal electoral alliance with the İYİ Par-
ty (İP), which is a secular nationalist party 
newly founded in 2017 by Meral Akşener, 
formerly from the MHP. The ultra-nation-
alist MHP played a key role when it allied 
with the AKP after the June 2015 elections, 
preventing the creation of an opposition 
government and leading to the snap elec-
tions of November 2015 amidst a resump-
tion in violent conflict between the army 
and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The 
MHP supported the government in the 2017 
referendum for a presidential system as 
well, which is when Akşener and other 
defectors broke from it to establish the İP. 
While the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) 
was not in a formal alliance with the CHP 
and the İP, it was crucial for the opposition 
that the HDP decided not to run candidates 
in major metropolitan cities such as Istan-
bul, Ankara, and Adana and put its support 
behind opposition candidates to create a 
unified opposition bloc. The HDP vote in 
these cities varied between 6 percent and 
13 percent in the national elections of 
2018. Thus, a key player (if not the key 
player) for the opposition is the former HDP 
leader and presidential candidate Selahattin 
Demirtaş. From his prison cell, Demirtaş ap-
pealed to Kurdish voters in municipalities 
without an HDP candidate not to abstain, 
but rather to support the opposition bloc. 
As such, the March 31 elections contained 
unusually complex dynamics, as there was 
a major economic crisis as well as multiple 
alliances that were not uniformly distributed 
across electoral districts. Whereas in smaller 
places local dynamics and individual candi-
dates matter more, in metropolises the elec-
tions, in fact, became a referendum for or 
against the government – or rather, Erdo-
ğan. A different dynamic was at play in 
Kurdish cities that were voting for or against 
government-appointed trustees. 
The Results: 
A Setback for the AKP 
At the time of this writing, election results 
have still not been finalized in Istanbul, in-
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dicating resistance, and probably conflict 
among the governing coalition, which did 
not expect the outcome. Although it is not 
clear how things will play out in the com-
ing days, a few trends are worth mentioning. 
First, and very significant, five out of six 
major metropolises have been won by the 
CHP (Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Adana, An-
talya), with four changing hands. This in 
itself is a major game-changer. It is the first 
time in 25 years that a party which has not 
come from the Islamic movement controls 
both Istanbul and Ankara. These two cities 
constitute 25 percent of the population in 
Turkey. With İzmir, Adana, Antalya, and 
Mersin, this figure rises to 40 percent and 
includes the most dynamic parts of the 
country. Istanbul and Ankara are crucial 
not only because they are the economic and 
cultural capitals of Turkey, but also because 
they are the dynamos for the coffers of the 
party. It is not news that the AKP was able 
to create an extensive patronage network 
using its control over these cities and their 
enormous municipality budgets. The invest-
ment and business deals that are distributed 
through Istanbul and Ankara are one of the 
main mechanisms through which the AKP 
has built and kept its hegemonic control 
over Turkey. The loss of these mechanisms 
is a major shock for the AKP governing 
machine. 
But looking at the metropolises is not 
enough to comprehend the setback that the 
AKP and Erdoğan have experienced. These 
bigger cities all voted “No” during the 2017 
referendum – as such, this is a continua-
tion of their opposition to Erdoğan and the 
AKP. Yet, a look at the rest of the country 
indicates a decline in AKP support. The one 
party that emerges as the winner – along 
with the CHP – is the AKP’s formal coali-
tion partner, the MHP. Although the AKP 
was able to retain its support in many of its 
strongholds, in one-third of the municipal-
ities in which the MHP and the AKP can-
didates ran against each other (e.g., Amasya 
and Kastamonu), the MHP won the elec-
tions, taking cities from the AKP’s control 
and implying a shift of AKP voters to the 
MHP. Moreover, in various cities where the 
AKP has won municipalities, there has been 
a significant drop in their share of the vote, 
when compared to the 2014 municipal elec-
tions. It is also important to note that it 
looks like the drop in AKP support corre-
sponds not only to an increase in support 
for the MHP, but also the İP and even the 
CHP in certain locations, although a detailed 
analysis is required to confirm this. Lastly, 
although there is no uniform pattern, HDP 
dominance continues in Kurdish-populated 
provinces of the country. The HDP increased 
its share of the vote in multiple cities, such 
as Diyarbakır, Batman, and Kars, but it saw 
a decrease in others, such as Hakkari, and 
it lost the municipality in some, such as 
Şırnak. One needs to consider the drastic in-
crease in the levels of repression and vio-
lence in the region after 2015 as well as the 
resulting demographic changes in order to 
assess this complicated picture. 
What Does This Picture Tell Us? 
Overall, these trends signify three impor-
tant shifts. First, the typical Turkish elec-
toral map – in which coastal towns remain 
with the secular CHP, the southeast with 
the Kurdish HDP, and central Anatolia with 
the AKP – has changed, as a number of 
Anatolian cities around Ankara have shifted 
to CHP control. Second, the truism that the 
Turkish electorate has solidified into two 
blocs is being challenged. Although the 
electorate has indeed been drastically polar-
ized over years, it looks like it might move 
across blocs, given the right conditions and 
effective campaigning. Lastly, the wide-
spread sense among the electorate and op-
position – that it is not possible to weaken 
the AKP through electoral means – has 
been proven wrong. This is even more sig-
nificant given the unfairness of elections. 
These results present a significant chal-
lenge to Erdoğan and the AKP’s dominance 
in Turkey. They show that the AKP cannot 
rule by itself anymore. It is firmly tied to 
its coalition with the MHP, which will, for 
sure, get more weight in intra-state deals. 
This might constrain Erdoğan’s hand, espe-
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cially in relation to the Kurdish conflict in 
Turkey and beyond. A new peace process 
with the Kurdish forces might be unlikely, 
given the hawkish MHP’s increasing power 
within the governing bloc. The results also 
suggest that the polarization tactics used 
by Erdoğan have a limit, and that the AKP 
has lost its appeal in motivating voters, 
especially given the state of the economy. 
When Erdoğan and the AKP entered Turk-
ish politics, they represented a new chapter, 
a hope for groups who felt alienated from 
the secular Kemalist system. Now, after 16 
years in power and having shifted increas-
ingly toward a personalist authoritarianism, 
Erdoğan is losing his grip, it seems, and is 
facing another crucial junction. 
A Bleak Outlook for an 
Unstable Future 
This is not the first time that Turkish citi-
zens have resisted Erdoğan’s plans – in 
fact, with the Gezi protests of June 2013, 
which saw millions of people on the streets, 
and the elections of June 2015, which pre-
vented an AKP majority in parliament, this 
can be seen as the third major occasion 
in which a significant number of Turkish 
citizens participated en masse in challeng-
ing the AKP’s dominance. In the first two 
instances, Erdoğan and the AKP opted for 
further repression and autocratization in 
response. With the election results still not 
finalized two weeks after the elections, and 
with government-backed media as well as 
various actors from the governing coalition 
crying “electoral fraud,” there is worry that 
the government is not willing to accept the 
election results. In fact, many elected offi-
cials from the HDP have still not received 
their mandates. The Supreme Election 
Council also refused office to elected HDP 
candidates who were expelled from office 
by a presidential decree during emergency 
rule, granting the office instead to the 
runner-up, which many argue is illegal. All 
these incidents, however, further erode 
the AKP’s legitimacy, which was built on 
the claim of electoral dominance, and 
might indicate a slide toward full-scale 
authoritarianism in Turkey. 
If the recounts in Istanbul confirm 
the unofficial win of İmamoğlu, the most 
important effect of the elections might be 
psychological. These elections have demon-
strated that – with an effective campaign 
and coalition-building that includes Kurd-
ish political forces – the opposition can 
make inroads to power, and that the AKP 
might still lose. This might provide the 
opposition forces in Turkey with what they 
need most – some hope – right as they 
receive access to more resources, and the 
possibility to affect people’s lives through 
municipal policies. They are, however, 
severely limited within a very centralized 
system where a lot of budgetary decisions 
are directly tied to Erdoğan. He can use this 
to strangle opposition municipalities, as he 
has threatened during the campaign, even 
though his hands might also be tied due to 
the dire state of the economy. 
As such, there seems to be no easy way 
out of this predicament for Turkey. The 
ongoing economic crisis is actually linked 
to a political crisis, as the new political sys-
tem in Turkey is stifling possibilities for 
effective government, choking the dynamic 
elements of the society. The opposition 
needs to take the longer view and use this 
opportunity effectively to organize and 
appeal to people – including to the AKP 
base – as well as to bridge differences. This 
might be the end of an era for Turkey, but 
a new day has not dawned yet. Instead, it 
looks like Turkey will remain in the twi-
light for awhile. 
Dr T. Deniz Erkmen is the 2019 IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at SWP.  
The Mercator IPC Fellowship Program at SWP is funded by Stiftung Mercator. 
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